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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-CLOSURE OF A PRELIMI-
NARY HEARING-PUBLIC'S RIGHT OF ACCESS-The Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court has held that a trial court must consider the public's
right of access to a preliminary hearing before ordering closure.
In re Petition of the Daily Item, __ Pa. Super. -, 456 A.2d 580
(1983).*'
On December 20, 1979, a preliminary hearing was held before a
district magistrate to determine whether Robert E. Dock should be
tried on criminal homicide charges.' The defendant moved through
his attorney to exclude the press and the public from the hearing.?
This motion was granted, and the magistrate subsequently im-
pounded a stenographic transcript of the proceeding, thus denying
members of the press access to the information contained therein.3
A newspaper, the Daily Item, then filed a petition in the lower
court to show cause why the information sought should not be re-
leased to the press.4 The lower court filed its opinion denying the
Daily Item access to the information contained in the stenographic
transcript, stating that the newspaper had no constitutional right
to this information. 5 The Daly Item then appealed to the Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court,6 contending that the court below abused its
discretion by denying the newspaper its clear legal right to attend
the preliminary hearing or to secure a transcript of the hearing.
7
The Daily Item further contended that the lower court erred in
closing an integral portion of the criminal process to the public
without first having required the defendant to demonstrate the ex-
* Due to the unavailability of. the Daily Item opinion in the Pennsylvania Superior
Court Reports at this time, citations to this reporter have been omitted.
1. In re Petition of the Daily Item, 456 A.2d 580 (1983).
2. Id. at 582.
3. 456 A.2d at 581.
4. Brief for Appellant at 1, Petition of the Daily Item, 456 A.2d 580 (1983).
5. 456 A.2d at 581. The lower court's rationale was quoted in the superior court
opinion:
In these circumstances, it is clear that the hearing before the District Justice to which
Petitioner sought admission and for which it requests a transcript was in part a pre-
liminary or prefatory stage of the criminal justice proceedings to which it had no
constitutional guarantee of admission, thus no constitutional right to the transcript.
Id.
6. Id. at 583.
7. Brief for Appellant at 2, In re Petition of the Daily Item, 456 A.2d 580 (1983).
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istence of a serious threat to his right to a fair trial.'
Judge Brosky, writing for the court,' reversed the lower court's
decision. He first noted that although the trial of the criminal case
involved had already been concluded, the appeal was not moot if
the questions involved were substantial and capable of repetition
unless settled.10 He found that this was a situation likely to recur,
and thus addressed the merits of the appeal."1
Judge Brosky rejected the lower court's finding that the public
had no right of access to the preliminary proceedings.1 2 He noted
that although the United States Supreme Court in Gannett v.
DePasquale's had held that members of the public did not have an
independent constitutional right to insist upon access to a pretrial
judicial proceeding based upon the sixth or fourteenth amend-
ments,1 ' the Court had reserved decision as to whether there was a
basis for this right in the first amendment.1" Judge Brosky ob-
served, however, that the Gannett Court had stated that even if
such a right existed, it could be outweighed in some circumstances
by a defendant's right to a fair trial."' Judge Brosky then distin-
guished the trial court decision reviewed in Gannett from the ap-
peal before him, noting that the closure decision in Gannett was
based on a balancing of the interests involved, 7 while the court
below had held that no first amendment rights were implicated be-
cause a preliminary hearing was not a trial to which the right of
access attached.1"
8. Id.
9. Judge McEwen joined in the opinion. Judge Beck filed a concurring opinion.
10. 456 A.2d at 581. See generally Colonial Gardens Nursing Home v. Bachman, 473
Pa. 56, 59, 373 A.2d 748, 750 (1977); McKeesport Area School Dist. v. Collins, 55 Pa.
Commw. 548, 423 A.2d 1112 (1980).
11. 456 A.2d at 581.
12. Id.
13. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
14. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution provides, in pertinent part: "no state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law ..... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
15. 456 A.2d at 581. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
.... .U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
16. 456 A.2d at 581.
17. Id. at 582. See 443 U.S. at 393. Judge Brosky also noted that Chief Justice Bur-
ger's and Justice Rehnquist's separate concurring opinions stated that no public right of
access existed as to pretrial proceedings. 456 A.2d at 581 n.1.
18. 456 A.2d at 581.
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The court then rejected the appellee's argument that article one,
section eleven of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides for
open courts,19 did not apply because a proceeding before a district
justice is not a court proceeding. 0 The court pointed to a Pennsyl-
vania statute2 1 as justification for holding that a district justice
proceeding, when criminal in nature, is to be treated as a court
proceeding.
22
The impact of Commonwealth v. Hayes2 was then considered.
In Hayes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a pretrial
proceeding could not be closed if some other means were available
to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial.24 The Hayes court re-
versed a closure order because the facts indicated that a less re-
strictive alternative was available. 5 In this case, however, Judge
Brosky noted that it could not be determined from the record if
closure was justified.26 He did conclude, however, that the trial
court had erred in not considering the public's right of access to
this proceeding, and reversed the order.27
Judge Beck filed a concurring opinion stating that she would
grant the public and press a limited right of access to a criminal
preliminary hearing.28 She stated that such a right would be based
on article one, sections eleven 9 and seven s of the Pennsylvania
19. Article one, section eleven of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Com-
monwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the legislature may by
law direct.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
20. 456 A.2d at 582.
21. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 103 (Purdon 1982) provides that a district justice, when
exercising criminal jurisdiction, sits as a court.
22. 456 A.2d at 582.
23. 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318 (1980).
24. Id. at 437, 414 A.2d at 327.
25. Id. In Hayes, the proceeding sought to be closed was a pretrial supression hearing
to be held immediately before trial. The Hayes court, relying on the rationale of Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), held that sequestration of the jurors would have
protected the defendant's right to a fair trial. 489 Pa. at 437, 414 A.2d at 327.
26. 456 A.2d at 582.
27. Id.
28. 456 A.2d at 583 (Beck, J., concurring). Judge Beck noted that the question was one
of first impression before the court. Id.
29. See supra note 19.
30. Article one, section seven of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in pertinent
part: "The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake to examine the
proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of government, and no law shall ever be made
to restrain the right thereof." PA. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
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Constitution, and the first amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. 1 Judge Beck noted that both the Pennsylvania and
United States Supreme Court had recognized the public's right of
access to both criminal trials and pretrial suppression hearings. 2
She further noted that although there has not been agreement in
Pennsylvania as to the foundation of this right of access,3 recent
federal cases have clarified both the issue and federal constitu-
tional right involved.3 4 Judge Beck then proceeded to give a four
part analysis to show that the public has a right of access to a
preliminary hearing.
The first part of Judge Beck's analysis identified the preliminary
hearing as an adjudicative criminal proceeding.33 Judge Beck noted
its historical background in English criminal jurisprudence, its
statutory rather than constitutional origin," and its initial codifi-
cation in Pennsylvania.37 Describing the primary purpose of a pre-
liminary hearing to be prevention of unlawful detention, 8 Judge
Beck declared that the public as well as the defendant had an in-
terest in this proceeding, the public's interest arising from its fun-
damental interest in ensuring justice.3 9
Judge Beck then cited article five, section one of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution," section 103 of the Crimes Code," and section
301 of the Judicial Code,"' in support of her contention that pre-
31. See supra note 15.
32. 456 A.2d at 583 (Beck, J., concurring). See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318
(1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980); Philadelphia Newspapers v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484,
387 A.2d 425, (1978), appeal dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979).
33. 456 A.2d at 583-84 (Beck, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 584 (Beck, J., concurring) (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596, and
United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1982)).
35. 456 A.2d at 584 (Beck, J., concurring).
36. Id.
37. Id. According to Judge Beck, Pennsylvania's first statutory provision for prelimi-
nary hearings was enacted in 1915. Prior to that date, the commonwealth relied on English
common law. Id. See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 124 A.2d 666 (1956).
38. 456 A.2d at 584 (Beck, J., concurring).
39. Id.
40. Article five, section one of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides as follows:
"[t]he judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system con-
sisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of com-
mon pleas, community courts (and) . . . justices of the peace." Id.
41. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 301 (Purdon 1981) provides: "the judicial power of the
Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system consisting of ... (9) District
Justices." Id.
42. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 103 (Purdon 1982). See supra note 21.
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liminary hearings before district justices are in fact hearings before
a court.48 The United States Supreme Court case of Coleman v.
Alabama44 was then cited to show that a preliminary hearing is a
stage of the criminal process. 45 Finally, she noted that there are
practical reasons for granting the press access to preliminary hear-
ings, such as the possibility that witnesses to the event might be
induced to come forward and testify.
46
The second part of Judge Beck's analysis focused on the basis
for granting the public access to a preliminary criminal proceeding
under the Pennsylvania Constitution. She concluded that this right
is provided for by article one, sections eleven and seven of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.47
Judge Beck noted that the word "open" in section eleven was
subject to two possible meanings-open to all those suffering a le-
gal injury, and open to the public.48 She noted that several lower
court opinions, 49 as well as the concurring opinions in Common-
wealth v. Hayes,50 gave credence to this second meaning of
"open." 1 Although the first meaning appeared more often, Judge
Beck stated that this did not foreclose a second meaning.52 She
finally noted that the second meaning of the open court provision
was underscored by the court in Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v.
Cavell."
Turning her attention to section seven," Judge Beck declared
that this provision paralleled the first amendment to the United
States Constitution." She stated that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has recognized that some right to gather news exists, but
43. 456 A.2d at 584-85 (Beck, J., concurring).
44. 399 U.S. 1 (1970). In Coleman, the Supreme Court held that a preliminary hear-
ing is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution to which an accused is entitled to appointed
counsel. Id. at 10.
45. 456 A.2d at 585 (Beck, J., concurring).
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 19 and 30.
48. 456 A.2d at 586 (Beck, J., concurring).
49. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Klinger, 75 Pa. D. & C.2d 664 (Perry Co. 1976);
Declamp v. Hover, 57 Berks 17, affd, 205 Pa. Super. 732, 208 A.2d 479 (1965).
50. 489 Pa. 419, 438, 414 A.2d 318, 328 (1980). Justices Kaufmann, Larsen and
Flaherty filed concurring opinions.
51. 456 A.2d at 586 (Beck, J., concurring).
52. Id.
53. Id. See 185 Pa. Super. 176, 138 A.2d 246 (1958). See also infra note 84 and accom-
panying text.
54. See supra note 30.
55. 456 A.2d at 587 (Beck, J., concurring). See also supra note 15.
1984
Duquesne Law Review
that this right is not absolute."
The third part of Judge Beck's analysis examined the public's
right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings under the first
amendment to the United States Constitution. 57 She noted that
the United States Supreme Court has held that a first amendment
right of press access to a criminal trial does exist.58
Judge Beck noted that although the United States Supreme
Court had ruled that the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution" did not guarantee access in a pretrial context, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had decided
in United States v. Criden, Appeal of Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc.60 that the press was entitled to access to certain pretrial pro-
ceedings on due process claims."' The judge found the rationale of
Criden to be persuasive reasoning for applying first amendment
rights of access to preliminary hearings.8 2
Judge Beck finally turned to the problem of balancing the defen-
dant's right to a fair trialas with the press' right of access when a
defendant requests that a preliminary hearing be closed."' She pro-
posed that a defendant must show at least a "serious threat" to his
right to a fair trial in order for closure to be proper. 5 She stated
that the threat to defendant's right to a fair trial should be likely
and immediate.6" Judge Beck also pointed to the American Bar As-
sociation's recommendation that a pretrial proceeding only be
closed if the information revealed from such a proceeding would
create a "clear and present danger" to a defendant's right to a fair
trial.6
7
In conclusion, Judge Beck recommended that a three step pro-
56. 456 A.2d at 587 (Beck, J., concurring). See McMullan v. Wohlegemuth, 453 Pa.
147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 970 (1974).
57. 456 A.2d at 587 (Beck, J. concurring).
58. Id. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555.
59. See supra note 15.
60. See 675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1982). In Criden, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the reason for granting a first amendment right of access to trials in Rich-
mond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), applied equally to pretrial criminal proceedings.
61. 456 A.2d at 588 (Beck, J., concurring).
62. Id.
63. Judge Beck pointed out that a defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial
under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article one, section nine




67. Id. See American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of
Justice: Fair Trial and Free Press, Standard 8-3.2 (2d ed. 1980).
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cess be taken before a preliminary hearing is closed. She stated
that a judge should consider first whether alternate means exist to
protect the defendant's trial rights, then whether the closure is
likely to prevent the feared publicity, and finally provide the rea-
sons for the closure decision.68
The public's right to attend a criminal trial in the United States
is integrally connected to our English common law heritage.69 En-
glish common law followed an unbroken tradition of conducting
criminal trials publicly.70 Even the court of Star Chamber, a name
linked to secrecy, apparently conducted public trials.7 1 This rule of
publicity has remained a constant throughout the growth and de-
velopment of the English common law system.73 This feature of the
English common law was carried to the American colonies by the
English settlers, and appeared in many of the colonial govern-
ments' first lawss.7 The colonies preserved these open trial provi-
sions in their constitutions when they subsequently became
states.74 The federal government also enacted a provision to pro-
tect this right.
75
The open trial provision was traditionally viewed as essential to
the integrity of the trial. 6 It discouraged party misconduct and
perjury, while giving assurances that the proceedings were being
conducted fairly.77 This right is, undoubtedly, critical to the ac-
cused and is specifically provided to him by both the Pennsylvania
and the United States Constitutions.7 8 It is, however, also of ex-
treme importance to the public, serving to provide the appearance
of justice by allowing the public to observe the proceeding.
Whether this right was specifically or implicitly granted to the
public was a question of some debate. 9
68. 456 A.2d at 590 (Beck, J., concurring).
69. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948).
70. T. SMITH, DEREPUBLICiA ANGLORUM 101 (Alston ed. 1972).
71. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 156 nn. 5 & 7, 163 (4th ed. 1927).
72. F. POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 31-32 (1904).
73. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOcumEzNTARY HISTORY 129, 140 (1971).
74. Id. at 271.
75. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
76. 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827). Bentham notes:
"Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other
checks are of small account." Id.
77. M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 343-45 (6th ed. 1820).
See also 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372-73.
78. See PA. CONST. art. I, §9: U. S. CONST. amend VI.
79. See generally Gannett, 443 U.S. 368; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555.
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Pennsylvania's open court provision 0 has been found to stand
for two separate propositions. First, it clearly means that the
Pennsylvania courts are open to all cases involving a recognizable
legal injury." Second, this phrase has been held to stand for the
proposition that the Pennsylvania courts are open to the public."s
The Pennsylvania Superior Court emphasized this second inter-
pretation in Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Cavell."s The Cavell
court was faced with the issue of whether the defendant was de-
prived of his constitutional right to a public trial when the trial
judge excluded the public from the trial with the consent of defen-
dant's counsel.8s In holding that a defendant could waive the right
to a public trial,8 5 the Cavell court noted that the public also had a
constitutional right to attend a criminal trial.8 6 The Cavell court
held this right of the public to be separate and distinct from the
accused's right to a public trial.8 7 Relying on Commonwealth v.
Trinkle,8a however, the Cavell court recognized some limitations
on the public's right to attend a criminal trial.89
The open court provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution was
applied in denying an accused's request to exclude the media from
a preliminary hearing in Commonwealth v. Klinger.90 The Klinger
court qualified its holding by stating that the evidence of a clear
and present danger of uncorrectable prejudice to the defendant's
right to a fair trial would have justified an opposite conclusion."1
In contrast to the Pennsylvania Constitution, the United States
80. For the text of article I, § 11, see supra note 19.
81. Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975).
82. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318 (1980); Common-
wealth v. Klinger, 75 Pa. D. & C.2d 664 (Perry Co. 1976).
83. 185 Pa. Super. 176, 138 A.2d 246 (1958).
84. Id. at 181, 138 A.2d at 248. In Cavell, the defendant was appealing his conviction
of robbery with aggravating circumstances. At his trial, the judge had ordered the courtroom
cleared with the consent of counsel for both the defendant and the Commonwealth. The
defendant later contended that excluding the public from his trial violated his right to a
public trial. Id.
85. Id. at 183, 138 A.2d at 249.
86. Id. at 184, 138 A.2d at 250. The Cavell court questioned whether the public could
have been excluded from the trial if they had sought readmission. The court noted that this
issue was not before them. Id.
87. Id.
88. 279 Pa. 564, 124 A. 191 (1924).
89. 185 Pa. Super. at 182, 138 A.2d at 249. The proposed limitations would operate:
(1) to prevent overcrowding; (2) to maintain proper decorum; or (3) to protect minors in-
volved with the case from being subject to scandalous or indecent matters. Id.
90. 75 Pa. D. & C.2d 664 (Perry Co. 1976).
91. Id. at 665.
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Constitution guarantees the accused the right to a speedy and pub-
lic trial by an impartial jury.92 This right was held to be personal
to the accused in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale." The issue before
the Gannett Court was whether the public had an independent
constitutional right of access to a pretrial suppression hearing
where the accused, the prosecutor, and the trial judge had agreed
to the closure to ensure a fair trial.9 The Gannett Court held that
the public had no constitutional right to attend a criminal trial
under the sixth and fourteenth amendments, 8 but reserved analy-
sis on whether such a right existed under the first and fourteenth
amendments." The Court observed that even if this right existed
under the first and fourteenth amendments, it was not violated by
excluding the public and press from a pretrial suppression hearing
in order to ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial. 7 The Court
noted the danger to a defendant's fair trial rights caused by public-
ity," especially publicity of a pretrial suppression hearing."
Closure of pretrial proceedings was found by the Gannett Court
to be one of the most effective means of ensuring a defendant's
right to a fair trial. 00 The Gannett Court also observed that
neither the public nor the press had the right to attend or report
on pretrial proceedings under English common law. 011 Similarly,
the original New York Field Code of Criminal Procedure provided
for the closure of pretrial hearings upon the defendant's request.102
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was faced with a similar clo-
sure of a pretrial suppression hearing in Commonwealth v.
92. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
93. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
94. Id. at 370-71.
95. Id. at 391. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the court, which was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist each filed concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justices Brennan,
White, and Marshall. See also infra note 116.
96. Id. at 392.
97. Id. at 392-93.
98. Id. at 378.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 379.
101. Id. at 389 & n.20. See E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 75 (6th ed. 1967): "It
must, of course, be remembered, that the principle of publicity only applies to the actual
trial of a case, not necessarily to the preliminary or prefatory Rule 5.3 (iii) stages of the
proceedings . Id. See also King v. Fisher, 2 Camp. 563, 170 Eng. Rep. 1253 (N.P.
1811).
102. See 443 U.S. at 390.
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Hayes.10 8 The Hayes court, while relying heavily on the rationale
of Gannett, held that closure may not be ordered where there is
some other procedural device to protect the defendant's right to a
fair trial. 10 4 The Hayes court found the situation before it distin-
guishable from Gannett, where the trial court had adequately con-
sidered available alternatives,10 5 and Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Jerome,10 6 where closure had been necessary to assure a fair
trial.
107
Whether the public has an implicit constitutional right to attend
a criminal trial under the first and fourteenth amendments was
finally answered affirmatively by the United States Supreme Court
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.08 The Richmond
Newspapers Court distinguished Gannett, noting that the decision
there centered around a pretrial suppression hearing, as opposed to
an actual trial.109 The Richmond Newspapers Court observed that
a concurrence in Gannett had specifically emphasized that a sup-
pression of evidence hearing was not a trial." 0
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers further
emphasized this distinction."' Justice Brennan noted that the jus-
tification for closure of pretrial hearings was the necessity of
preventing suppressible evidence from being revealed to the public
before the jury pool could become fixed and subject to sequestra-
tion."12 In contrast, Justice Brennan observed, this justification was
totally lacking where a trial was to be closed."
Petition of Daily Item presented a question of first impression
103. 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1981).
104. 489 Pa. at 437, 414 A.2d at 327.
105. Id. at 424, 414 A.2d at 319-20.
106. 478 Pa. 484, 387 A.2d 425 (1978), appeal dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979).
107. 489 Pa. at 428, n.7, 414 A.2d at 322, n.7.
108. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). In Richmond Newspapers, the trial court granted the defen-
dant's motion that his murder trial be closed to the public. No objection was made by either
the prosecution or two of appellant's reporters who were present in the court room. The
trial judge believed that a Virginia statute empowered him to close the trial. Id. at 560. See
VIRGINIA CODE §19.2-266 (Supp. 1980) which provides in part: "In the trial of all criminal
cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion,
exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial,
provided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated." Id. See also
infra note 120.
109. 448 U.S. at 564.
110. Id. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
111. 448 U.S. at 584 (Brennan, J., concurring).




for the Pennsylvania appellate courts.1" The United States Su-
preme Court also has not squarely met this issue, but Gannett and
Richmond Newspapers shed some light on this area. Daily Item is
apparently consistent with the underlying rationale of the latter
two cases. The United States Supreme Court in Richmond de-
clared that the public has a right of access to attend a criminal
trial,'15 and five members of the Gannett Court"' were unwilling
to say that the public had no right of access to a pretrial suppres-
sion hearing."1
Neither the public's right to attend a criminal trial nor a prelim-
inary criminal hearing is absolute." s8 In both cases, the trial court
must determine whether other alternatives besides closure exist
which will ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial." 9 Precisely
what guidelines the court should use are not clear,12 0 but the
problems which may possibly be confronted in a pretrial hearing
should be carefully assessed so that the defendant is not unfairly
prejudiced by erroneous information being conveyed to potential
jurors.' 2 ' In view of the public's apparent right of access to these
114. See 456 A.2d at 583.
115. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555.
116. Justice Blackmun's opinion in Gannett, where he concurs in part and dissents in
part, was joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall. These Justices did not agree
that the sixth amendment guarantees were personal to the accused, and thought that such a
decision discarded important interests of the press and the public. See 443 U.S. at 407
(Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Powell in his concurrence expressed his
view that the first and fourteenth amendments extend at least a limited right of access to
the public, even to a pretrial suppression hearing. See 443 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). See also supra note 95.
117. 443 U.S. 368.
118. See Gannett, 443 U.S. 368; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555.
119. Id.
120. In Richmond Newspaper, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Ste-
vens, found that a criminal trial must be open to the public, absent any overriding interests
articulated in the findings. 448 U.S. at 581 & n.18. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, found a presumption of openness, finding the Virginia statute in question violative of
the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 598 & n.24 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Stewart's concurrence stated that a trial judge should be able to place reasonable restric-
tions on the press and the public's right to be in the courtroom. Id. at 600 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Justice Powell, in his concurrence in Gannett argued that the public and the
press had a first and fourteenth amendment right to be present at a pretrial suppression
hearing. 443 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell further stated that this right
was not absolute, but was limited by the defendant's right to a fair trial and by the needs of
government to obtain convictions and to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive informa-
tion and the identity of informants. Id. at 398 (Powell, J., concurring). See also supra note
108.
121. 456 A.2d at 589.
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proceedings,12 however, other less restrictive means of protecting
the defendant's right to a fair trial should thus be considered. The
lower court's failure to even consider any available alternatives was
crucial to the holding in Daily Item. A consideration of other pos-
sible alternatives in balancing the public's right of access with the
defendant's right to a fair trial could have justified the closure. 2 '
Without any record of such an analysis, however, the superior
court had no choice but to find that the lower court erred in its
holding.
Charles J. Porter
122. See supra note 116. See also Commonwealth v. Contakos, 499 Pa. 340, 453 A.2d
578 (1982). In Contakos, the court cleared the courtroom of all but a few members of the
press in light of a purported threat against a witness' life. The appellant was thereafter
granted a new trial on the grounds that the abrupt exclusion of the public during the pres-
entation of the Commonwealth's most damaging testimony unduly focused the jury's
attention on that testimony. For a recent United States Supreme Court decision upholding
this right, see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984)
(public right of access extends to voir dire examinations of potential jurors; closure of signif-
icant segments thereof without considering alternatives held unconstitutional).
123. See 456 A.2d at 589.
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